A Year of Urang at Chelsea Bridge Wharf – An Opportunity Wasted?

Summary

When Urang took over management at Chelsea Bridge Wharf in May 2025, following a long and contested Right to Manage (RTM) process, leaseholders were promised a new era of transparency, accountability and better value for money while groups such as the Leasehold Knowledge Partnership (LKP) suggested that CBW, as one of the largest RTM developments in the country, could become a model for leaseholder empowerment nationwide. Those of us who actually live here know that these idealised representations of CBW are a long way from the truth.

A year later, the reality looks rather different. Despite endless promises of ”a new era of transparency ”, “reviewing contracts”, securing “best value”, many leaseholders are struggling to identify any major improvements at all. Service charges have increased above inflation, major spending proposals continue to emerge without meaningful information or consultation with leaseholders, transparency is extremely limited, and meaningful democratic accountability remains absent.

The problem, however, is not simply Urang. The deeper issue is the governance structure created around the RTM company itself. Directors were ”elected” through a heavily manipulated and low-participation process, leaseholders are excluded from meetings, key documents are withheld, and major decisions continue to be taken behind closed doors. In practice, many leaseholders feel they replaced one unaccountable system with another.

There may have been some modest improvements in areas such as cleaning and responsiveness, but the grand promises of transformation have not materialised. Instead, Chelsea Bridge Wharf has become a warning about what can happen when RTM operates without proper checks, balances or democratic safeguards.

Urang promised a ‘new age of transparency’ but have pulled down the shutters

A year ago, many leaseholders at Chelsea Bridge Wharf were told that a new dawn was arriving. Out would go Rendall & Rittner, long criticized by residents over service charges, transparency, and accountability. In would come resident control through Right to Manage (RTM), with Urang taking over management duties. There was excitement. There was optimism. There was talk of democracy, accountability, and “taking back control.” Urang (with little credibility even at the time) promised a ‘new age of transparency’.

So now, after a year of Urang at Chelsea Bridge Wharf, how has it actually gone? At the current time, despite Right to Manage, leaseholders at Chelsea Bridge Wharf:

Leaseholders supported the Right to Manage but did not have any meaningful say in the appointment of Urang nor in the renewal of Urang’s contract in January 2026 (a contract which they are unable to see unless they sign an NDA which is so sweeping that it would amount to a gagging order on anything to do with Urang). Indeed leaseholders were not even informed that Urang’s contract had been renewed in January 2026 or for how long or with what fees, terms and conditions,

The more things change the more they stay the same

The central promise of RTM was that leaseholders would finally have control over their own development. The theory sounds sensible enough. Instead of an external freeholder-appointed agent running the block, leaseholders themselves — through elected RTM directors — would appoint and oversee managing agents in residents’ interests.

In practice, many residents are struggling to identify any meaningful change. Service charges? Continuing to increase above inflation. Transparency? Non existent. Consultation? Extremely limited and even when it so carried out Urang/the RTM company refuse to share the results (as in their November 2025 ‘residents’ survey’. Large spending plans? Alive and well.

And yet somehow, everyone is repeatedly told this is all very different from before.

The great savings that never arrived – above inflation service charge increases and buildings insurance up 33%

One of the strongest arguments for RTM was always financial. Leaseholders were encouraged to believe that by removing the old structures and appointing a new agent, substantial efficiencies and savings could be achieved. Urang also claimed within weeks of being appointed that they had reviewed all existing contracts to determine if they were good value for money.

One contract that did change was the buildings insurance for Warwick buildings (267 apartments) which has increased by 33% to about £600 per apartment. Average buildings insurance per apartment across the development appear to be around £1,000 (based on Urang’s own budget statement).

Budgets which are months late and baffling: unclear service charge billing

The 2026-27 budget for Warwick buildings were 2 months late. No explanation was given initially but when pressed Urang stated that discussion between the directors regarding the CAPEX (capital expenditure) and reserve fund charges had gone on longer than expected. But leaseholders have been given no account of what these discussions were about specifically or what the outcome was.

Service charges are up around 5% year on year (budget to budget) which is well above inflation at 3%. So despite all the claims that Urang/ the RTM company could reduce service charges compared to Rendall and Rittner, this turns out not to be the case. Not even in the first budget when you would hope Urang/RTM company wanted to create a good impression and create confidence going forward. They have not listened to leaseholders whose clearly expressed priority is for reduction of service charges.

Urang refuse to supply separate budgets for each of the Warwick buildings although they are separate accounting/seve charge units.

The service charge billing for Warwick has been changed to 6 monthly (from annual) without explanation. I guess it gives then 2 opportunities a year to increase the service charge rather than one. Many leaseholders have pointed out that the format of the billing is just as confusing as that of Rendall and Rittner and like Rendall and Rittner, Urang refuse to show clearly, in a prominent place, a single figure for the annual or monthly service charge, This makes it very hard to compare change in the service charge year on year. Further analysis of the budget will be presented in due course.

Baffling Section 20 processes

Most notably, there have been Section 20 consultation proposals involving extensive lift works and carpet replacement schemes across the development. One proposal reportedly involved expenditure potentially exceeding £1 million across multiple lifts. (Chelsea Bridge Wharf News)

Initial proposals were criticised by leaseholders for lacking detail around costs, timelines and scope. The criticism became so intense that one earlier Section 20 notice had to be withdrawn and reworked. Urang ackncoldged they ‘needed to do better’ on section 20 processes but after a few months came forward with another even more confused section 20 proposal which ommitted the carwepre rpeleevemet (for now).

Leaseholders have objected to Urang’s latest section 20 notice of intent regarding the replacement or refurbishment of up to 24 lifts at an approximate cost of £100,000 per lift.


Leaseholders naturally want to know:

  • Which lifts?
  • When exactly?
  • At what cost?
  • Why now?
  • What alternatives were considered?
  • Is this repair, replacement or enhancement?
  • How can residents meaningfully respond to consultations on proposals that are not clearly defined?
  • Where is the supposedly independent report which Urang/the CBW RTM company say they have commissioned which (they say) supports the lift replacement programme?

Could it be that Urang/CBW RTM company wanted the window for objections to the Section 20 process to close before they circulated the report, so that leaseholders could not use the evidence in the report to make an informed decision about the lift replacement programme?

These are not unreasonable questions when residents may ultimately foot bills running into thousands of pounds each.

Dodgy elections and a 9 minute AGM

Nothing perhaps captures the current mood better than the now infamous nine-minute AGM in December 2025.

For years, residents complained about a lack of fair elections for the leadership of the residents’ association (CBWRA) and a lack of meaningful democratic accountability. After Right to Manage was achieved, the self-appointed directors (the same people who had refused to hold fair elections for the residents’ association) refused to submit themselves to a vote and claimed that it was important to have “stability”. Rather than having directors elected, they argued that the self-appointed directors would simply choose whether or not to add new directors based on whether they thought “it would work” with them (i.e. they would only allow people who agreed with them to become directors).

In July 2025, three months after RTM was established, Urang were forced to agree to hold elections for directors and stated that they would take place in September that year. No reason was given as to why leaseholders would have to wait that long for elections. Predictably, when September arrived, Urang/the RTM company once again tried to postpone the elections. Tony Hymers claimed that they needed to get 75% of leaseholders to join the RTM company, otherwise it would not be a “fair election” and implied that they were working hard to achieve this,

However, a register of RTM members obtained by the author of this blog (following a statutory s.116 request, which Urang had no choice but to comply with) showed that the number of RTM members had barely changed since Urang took over and was still around 56%. In other words, there was never any realistic possibility of achieving 75% membership of the RTM company, and Mr Hymers was well aware of that when he made this disingenuous excuse for delaying the elections.

Eventually, Urang/the RTM company were forced to hold elections in December 2025. There were no ‘hustings’ meetings and no discussion. Candidates who wished to become directors completed an online form which was circulated to RTM members. No attempt to stimulate interest in the elections was made and every attempt was made to keep it low-key (the standard MO used by CBWRA). The ‘statements’ of the candidates were pretty much all bland and meaningless.

The actual election happened at an online AGM in December 2025. Those leaseholders joined could not see or hear each other (by design, on the LUMI platform, not because of any technical fault). The AGM, with three or four directors present and a representative of the online platform LUMI, lasted nine minutes and there was no discussion or opportunity for leaseholders to ask questions.

There was no opportunity for proper scrutiny, debate, candidate engagement or meaningful questioning. The voting process itself allowed the Chair (Louis Kendall) to use all neutral votes as he pleased (i.e. for himself or favoured candidates), and he refused to report how many such neutral votes had been cast or how they had been allocated.

Due to the deliberate policy of “low-keying” the election and refusing to hold any meetings where leaseholders could meet the candidates for director positions, participation was predictably very low. Around 136 leaseholders voted, which equates to less than 12% of all leaseholders and around 24% of RTM members.

Seven directors were elected, including all those who had chaired the CBWRA during the period in which RTM had been blocked, unfair elections had been held, and appalling behaviour towards leaseholders who spoke up about these issues had taken place. Several directors were also elected who were basically unknown to most leaseholders.

Since the election of these directors in December, up until the present time (the start of June), there has not been a single meeting between leaseholders and the RTM company. Residents have had little or no contact with the directors and very little idea of what they are actually doing.

Leaseholders are not allowed to attend meetings between the RTM company and Urang, and no minutes or notes from those meetings are shared. As a result, decisions affecting more than 1,100 homes are effectively being taken behind closed doors, with minimal transparency or accountability.

Not Listening to Leaseholders

Another recurring frustration is the sense that leaseholders themselves are often treated less as stakeholders and more as an inconvenience to be managed.

Residents report major decisions being made with minimal engagement. One example repeatedly raised is the management contract signed with Urang itself. Leaseholders have still not been allowed to see the contract itself.

This raises an uncomfortable question: If RTM companies are meant to represent leaseholders, how exactly are leaseholders supposed to hold them accountable when key information is withheld?

At present, the legal framework is surprisingly weak. RTM directors can wield significant power over multimillion-pound developments, major contracts and service charge expenditure, yet there are limited checks and balances unless leaseholders undertake lengthy and expensive legal action.

This is one reason why the Chelsea Bridge Wharf situation is relevant far beyond this development.

The wider leasehold problem

Chelsea Bridge Wharf is not unique. Across England, leaseholders increasingly find themselves trapped between three imperfect models:

  1. Traditional freeholder control.
  2. Managing agents with weak regulation.
  3. RTM companies which may themselves become opaque and unaccountable.

The political conversation around leasehold reform often assumes RTM is automatically the solution. But reality is more complicated. RTM can work well where governance is transparent, democratic and accountable. But where power becomes concentrated among small groups of directors with limited oversight, there are few checks and balances which leaseholders can use. Replacing one unaccountable structure with another is not genuine reform.

That is why leasehold reform must make the RTM model much more democratic and accountable to leaseholders, because despite the fact that new leasehold properties may be banned from 2030, it is clear that millions will remain in existing leasehold flats for many years to come and RTM will remain their most realistic option for increasing leaseholder power and being able to hire and fire managing agents.

What legislative change is needed?

Several reforms now seem urgently necessary.

1. Stronger regulation of managing agents

Managing agents still operate with surprisingly weak statutory regulation considering they oversee huge sums of leaseholders’ money.

There should be:

  • Mandatory professional regulation.
  • Clear fiduciary obligations.
  • Transparent procurement rules.
  • Full disclosure of commissions and relationships.
  • Strong penalties for non-compliance.

2. Stronger checks on RTM directors

RTM directors should not effectively operate as lightly supervised mini-politicians governing thousand-resident developments.

There should be:

  • Mandatory annual contested elections.
  • Minimum standards for AGMs and member participation.
  • Independent oversight of voting systems.
  • Easier rights to inspect contracts and records.
  • Stronger rights for leaseholders to challenge decisions without massive legal costs.

3. Genuine transparency

Leaseholders fund these developments. The money is theirs. That means residents should easily be able to access:

  • Management contracts.
  • Tendering information.
  • Survey results.
  • Meeting minutes.
  • Reserve fund discussions and decisions.
  • Major works planning documents.

Not after months of delay. Not under sweeping NDAs. Not after quasi-diplomatic negotiations worthy of a hostage exchange.

4. Reforms to Right to Manage Legislation

Ultimately, many of these problems stem from the bizarre nature of leasehold tenure itself. England remains one of the few countries still heavily reliant on a semi-feudal property structure where homeowners can pay enormous ongoing charges while exercising remarkably little control. Successive governments have promised reform. Progress has been glacial, with the Commonhold and Freehold Reform Bill now unlikely to be in effect before 2030 and minus the full recommendations of the Law Commission which included many improvements to the Right to Manage legislation. Developments like Chelsea Bridge Wharf demonstrate how RTM can simply mean swapping one unaccountable regime with another – instead of being ignored by freeholders we get to be ignored by RTM directors. That is not progress.

One year later

So where are we after a year of Urang at Chelsea Bridge Wharf? The banners may have changed. The management company staff and logo has changed. But for many leaseholders, the overall experience feels oddly familiar:

  • high service charges,
  • limited transparency,
  • weak consultation,
  • major spending proposals,
  • and governance structures many residents do not trust.

To be fair, some residents would acknowledge modest improvements in certain areas. Cleaning standards may have improved slightly in parts of the estate, and some operational issues appear to be dealt with somewhat faster than before.

But beyond that, it is difficult to identify major tangible benefits for leaseholders.

Residents were promised a revolution. Instead, they got a rebrand. I did in fact predict exactly this and have been saying for several years that RTM without a fairly elected and accountable group of directors would not deliver meaningful change. We have simply swapped one unaccountable regime for another.

One year on, LKP continues, in my view, to misrepresent events at Chelsea Bridge Wharf, telling a parliamentary hearing on 17th March 2026 that Berkeley Homes  ”handed over control of Chelsea Bridge Wharf—1,100 flats across the river—which, by the way, includes its corporate headquarters, to a right-to-manage company”. The truth is that Berkeley Homes contested the RTM application on 4 different grounds and they also contested and defeated an earlier application in 2012. LKP’s version of events around RTM also conveniently airbrushes the fact that some of the current directors of the RTM company are the same people that blocked RTM for many years and were only forced to change their position when the author of this blog published independent advice showing that RTM was indeed possible.

The point is that narratives about how ‘great’ RTM is at Chelsea Bridge Wharf do not at all reflect leaseholders’ views. We cannot go forward by denying what has happened in the past – it needs to be recognised and learnt from.

It is in leaseholders’ power to change the current situation but they need to find the courage to speak up for what they really want. We can do much better than this, we can become a great example of RTM but it won’t happen by Urang , the RTM company or indeed LKP blowing smoke up our collective rear. It will happen when the directors really are accountable and removable by leaseholders.

Category : AGM, Banana Republic, Berkeley Homes, Bullying, Canonbury Estate Management, CBW RTM company, CBWRA, Censorship, Chair Elections, commonhold, culture of fear, Elections, Electoral misconduct, freedom of speech, Freeholders, LKP, Lumi electoral software, management contract, Rendall & Rittner, Replacing Rendall and Rittner, Right to Manage, satisfaction survey, Section 20 notice, Service charges, Uncategorized, Urang, Warwick Building